Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st Century by Chemerinsky, Erwin
05_CHEMERINSKY_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004 12:20 PM 
 
PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AS THE UNITED 




We are at a time of the triumph of conservative judicial ideology.  Thirty-
two years ago, when William Rehnquist joined the Supreme Court, he was per-
ceived as the far right on the Court.  Now, virtually every view that he ex-
pressed has come to be the majority position.  The Court has significantly lim-
ited federal power under the Commerce Clause and section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,1 tremendously expanded the scope of state sovereign 
immunity,2 ordered the end of school desegregation orders,3 limited access to 
the courthouse for civil rights plaintiffs,4 and significantly relaxed restrictions on 
government aid to religion.5 
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 1. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that the civil damages provi-
sion of the Violence Against Women Act, which allows suit by victims of gender-motivated violence, 
exceeds the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and power under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments; Congress pursuant to 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot expand rights or create new rights; Congress may act 
to prevent or remedy violations of rights, and such laws must be “proportionate” and “congruent” to 
solving widespread and persistent constitutional violations); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zone Act, which prohibits possession of a firearm within 
1,000 feet of a school, exceeds the scope of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause). 
 2. See, e.g., Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (hold-
ing that state governments cannot be “sued” in federal agency proceedings that are adjudicatory in na-
ture); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that state governments cannot be sued in state 
court, even on federal claims, without their consent). 
 3. See, e.g., Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that desegregation orders 
must be ended when a school system achieves “unitary status”); Tresa Baldas, Saying Goodbye to De-
segregation Plans, 6/16/03 NLJ 4 (col. 1) (describing the effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
causing resegregation of schools). 
 4. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (concluding citizens have no private right of 
action to enforce Title VI regulations preventing recipients of federal funds from engaging in practices 
with a racially discriminatory impact). 
 5. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding a program that allows vouchers to 
be used for parochial and secular private schools, but not public schools, is constitutional even though 
96 percent of parents used their vouchers for parochial schools). 
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Having taught constitutional law for the last twenty-three years, I have a 
sense of a major overall shift to the right in constitutional law.  In 1980, when I 
taught my first constitutional law class, the Court had liberals such as William 
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall.  William Rehnquist, without question, was 
the most conservative member of the Court.  Today, there are no liberals in the 
mold of Brennan or Marshall; there are Justices, such as Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas, who are further to the right than Rehnquist and perhaps any 
other Justices in U.S. history. 
Yet, the popular perception, and maybe even the perception among some 
academics, is that the Supreme Court has not moved all that far to the right.  
What explains the failure to recognize how much conservatives have triumphed 
in constitutional law?  In part, the incremental nature of constitutional law ex-
plains why the overall conservativism has not been recognized.  Constitutional 
law, of course, develops case-by-case, not all at once.  No single decision 
changes the nature of constitutional law.  Also, the conservative position has 
not triumphed in some of the most politically visible and controversial areas; 
the Court has not ended the constitutional right to abortion, affirmative action, 
or the restrictions on school prayers.  It is easy for people to generalize from 
these examples, failing to recognize all of the other areas where conservative 
views have won out on the Supreme Court.  Additionally, political rhetoric 
about the judiciary has not caught up to the current reality; conservatives con-
tinue to rail against judicial activism,6 even at a time when the activism on the 
Supreme Courtoverturning laws, overruling precedentsis all in a conserva-
tive direction.7  Finally, many of the Rehnquist Court’s most dramatic changes 
have been procedural in nature, such as in restricting habeas corpus,8 limiting 
access to the courts,9 and expanding sovereign immunity.10  These do not capture 
public attention in a way likely to change overall perceptions of the Court. 
This essay makes three main points.  First, there are major differences be-
tween progressive and conservative judicial philosophies.11  Second, the differ-
ences stem from ideology and are not a product of varying methods of judicial 
interpretation; the differences in methodologies between conservatives and 
progressives are driven by the desired results each contingent wants to reach.  
Third, the challenge for progressive academics is to figure out how to respond 
to the reality of a conservative Supreme Court for the foreseeable future. 
 
 6. Neil A. Lewis, Conservatives Furious Over Court’s Direction, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at 
A19. 
 7. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001). 
 8. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 469 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 9. See, e.g., Alexander, 532 U.S. 275. 
 10. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 11. Throughout this paper, I use the word “progressive” because it is part of the title of this sympo-
sium.  I regard it as synonymous with “liberal” and attach no significance to the choice of the word 
“progressive” over the term “liberal.” 
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II 
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONSERVATIVE  
AND PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Six major differences exist between progressives and conservatives in their 
views about Supreme Court decisionmaking.  These, of course, are not exhaus-
tive of all the differences that exist, but they do capture many of the most im-
portant issues facing the Supreme Court today. 
First, conservatives seek to narrow the reach of federal power and protect 
“states’ rights.”  For example, conservatives want to limit the scope of Con-
gress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and use the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal power.  Pro-
gressives seek to retain the broad definitions of congressional power that pre-
vailed from 1937 until the Rehnquist Court in the mid-1990s.   Notably, the 
Court’s recent decisions limiting the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power—United States v. Lopez12 and United States v. Morrison13—were 5-4 deci-
sions, with the Court divided along ideological lines.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote for the Court in both cases to limit Congress’s power to act under the 
Commerce Clause. The dissents were by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, who urged adherence to the broad definition of federal power that 
had been followed since the mid-1930s. 
The Court’s major decision limiting the scope of Congress’s power under 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, City of Boerne v. Flores, was by a 6-
3 margin.14  But subsequent cases applying it to find particular laws outside the 
scope of the section five power were 5-4 decisions split along ideological lines.15  
Likewise, the Court’s revival of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal 
power was by a 6-3 decision,16 but its application in Printz v. United States to in-
 
 12. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 13. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 14. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 15. See, e.g., Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that state governments 
cannot be sued for violating Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment 
discrimination against the disabled, because the law does not fit within the scope of Congress’s powers 
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(holding that state governments cannot be sued for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act because the law does not fit within the scope of Congress’s powers under section five of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627 (1999) (holding that federal law authorizing suits against states for patent violations was unconstitu-
tional as not valid under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and that Eleventh Amendment 
bars such suits). But see Nevada Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that the 
Family and Medical Leave Act provision requiring employers to provide employees unpaid leave to 
care for family members is a valid enactment pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and thus a basis for suit against a state government). 
 16. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the Low Level Radioactive 
Waste Disposal Act is unconstitutional in its requirement that states clean up their nuclear wastes; 
Congress seeking to compel state legislative or regulatory action violates the Tenth Amendment). 
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validate the Brady Handgun Control Act was 5-4, again split along ideological 
lines.17 
This divide between progressives and conservatives is not new.  Throughout 
U.S. history, conservatives have invoked federalism to limit federal power, such 
as in the use of “states’ rights” to oppose abolition of slavery, New Deal pro-
grams, desegregation, and federal civil rights laws. 
Second, conservatives seek to restrict access to the courts, especially in cases 
involving civil rights, while progressives seek to ensure the availability of judi-
cial remedies.  For example, in recent years, in a series of 5-4 decisions, the Su-
preme Court has expanded the scope of state sovereign immunity.18  The more 
liberal members of the Court have vehemently objected to the majority’s limita-
tion of the ability of injured individuals to sue state governments for redress. 
There are many other examples of recent cases, divided 5-4 along ideologi-
cal lines, in which the majority has restricted access to the courts.  In Alexander 
v. Sandoval, the Court ruled that there is no private right of action to enforce 
the regulations to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits recipi-
ents of federal funds from engaging in practices which have a racially discrimi-
natory impact.19  In Circuit City v. Adams, the Court declared that the Federal 
Arbitration Act requires arbitration of state law discrimination claims when 
contractual provisions call for arbitration of employment related disputes.20  In 
Booth v. Churner, the Court said that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires 
that a prisoner seeking money damages exhaust prison administrative remedies, 
even if the prison cannot provide such a remedy, as long as it can offer the pris-
oner something of value.21  In Saucier v. Katz, the Court held that a police offi-
cer can be deemed protected by qualified immunity, even when a jury finds that 
the officer used excessive force.22 
Significantly, in Buckhannon Board v. West Virginia Department of Health 
and Human Resources, the Court made it much more difficult for successful 
 
 17. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the Brady Handgun Control Act, which requires state and 
local law enforcement personnel to conduct background checks before issuing permits, violates the 
Tenth Amendment because Congress is compelling state and local governments to carry out a federal 
mandate). 
 18. See, e.g., Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (hold-
ing that state governments cannot be “sued” in federal agency proceedings that are adjudicatory in na-
ture); Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (holding that state governments cannot be sued in state court, even on fed-
eral claims, without their consent); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1999) (holding 
that Congress may authorize suits against states and abrogate the Eleventh Amendment only pursuant 
to Congress’s power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and not pursuant to other con-
gressional powers). 
 19. 532 U.S. at 275. 
 20. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 21. 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requirement for exhaustion 
of administrative remedies applies when the prisoner is seeking monetary relief and when the grievance 
procedure does not permit recovery of money, as long as the grievance process can provide some re-
sponsive action). 
 22. 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (holding that in a civil rights case alleging constitutionally excessive force, 
the tests for qualified immunity and reasonableness are distinct; a finding of excessive force does not 
preclude a finding of qualified immunity). 
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plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees.23  The Court said a plaintiff is not deemed to 
“prevail” just because his or her lawsuit is the “catalyst” for the government to 
change its policy.24  Attorneys’ fees are to be awarded only when a judicial ac-
tiona judgment or consent decreefavors the plaintiff.25 
Again, this divide between liberals and conservatives is not surprising.  Pro-
gressives long have been advocates for and conservatives have opposed civil 
rights.  These attitudes are very much reflected in these recent decisions con-
cerning the availability of the courts to civil rights litigants. 
Third, conservatives have sought to expand government aid to religion, 
while progressives have attempted to maintain a wall separating church and 
state.  Conservatives on the Court, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, advocate accommodating religion in government, allowing 
prayer in schools and permitting government assistance to parochial schools.  
Liberals traditionally oppose such efforts and seek to have a secular govern-
ment with strict limits on government support for religion. 
Most recently, this dichotomy was evident in the Supreme Court’s decision 
upholding a state program that allowed vouchers to be used in parochial 
schools.  In Zelman v, Simmons-Harris, the Court held a program allowing 
vouchers to be used for parochial and secular private schools, but not public 
schools, is constitutional even though 96 percent of parents used their vouchers 
for parochial schools.26  The Court split 5-4, along familiar ideological lines, with 
Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas in the majority; 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. 
Fourth, conservatives seek to limit the scope of individual rights, whereas 
progressives seek to maintain and expand personal freedoms under the Consti-
tution.  This is true for rights enumerated in the Constitution, as well as for non-
textual rights.  For example, one of the most dramatic restrictions on individual 
rights during the Rehnquist Court has been Employment Division v. Smith, in 
which the Court significantly limited the scope of the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment and held that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be used to 
challenge a neutral law of general applicability, no matter how much it burdens 
religion. 27  Of course, the most dramatic example of different liberal and con-
servative views as to rights is abortion, with conservatives seeking to end consti-
tutional protection for abortion rights and progressives trying to maintain them. 
Fifth, conservatives and liberals differ substantially as to the appropriate 
scope of criminal defendants’ rights.  Conservatives emphasize security over the 
protecting the rights of suspected criminals; progressives stress safeguarding 
criminal defendants from state power.  This, too, is not new.  In 1968, presiden-
tial candidate Richard Nixon campaigned against the Warren Court’s criminal 
 
 23. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 24. Id. at 605. 
 25. Id. at 606. 
 26. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 27. 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990). 
05_CHEMERINSKY_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:20 PM 
58 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 67:53 
procedure decisions.  For decades, conservatives have sided with the govern-
ment in restricting the rights of criminal defendants. 
For example, in McKune v. Lile28 the Court ruled 5-4 that prison officials did 
not violate the Fifth Amendment when they revoked certain privileges of an 
inmate who refused to disclose his sexual history during a sex-treatment of-
fender program.  Most recently, in two 5-4 decisions, the Court held that it is 
not cruel and unusual punishment for the government to impose life sentences 
on shoplifters under California’s three strikes law.29 
Sixth, conservatives seek to eliminate affirmative action as discrimination.  
Progressives seek to use affirmative action to ensure diversity and remedy a 
long legacy of racial discrimination.  Few issues so clearly divide the difference 
between liberals and conservatives as does affirmative action.  For instance, the 
Court’s recent decision upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s af-
firmative action program was split 5-4, and the opinions reflected deep ideo-
logical divisions within the Court.30 
Finally, one area which does not follow the traditional conserva-
tive/progressive division is freedom of speech.  Traditionally, progressives have 
been regarded as more speech protective, and conservatives have been thought 
to be more willing to uphold government regulation of speech.  Recently, how-
ever, it is often conservatives who tend to be more speech protective, especially 
when it comes to protecting campaign contributions and commercial speech.  
On the current Court, the most conservative Justices seek to change the law and 
find contribution limits in election campaigns unconstitutional.31 
A recent example of this shift in speech cases is Republican Party of Minne-
sota v. White,32 in which the five most conservative Justices voted to declare un-
constitutional a state law prohibiting candidates for elected judicial office from 
making statements about disputed legal or political issues.  The four more pro-
gressive Justices would have upheld the restrictions.  This decision reflects a 
conservative philosophy of interpreting the First Amendment to require gov-
ernment deregulation of speech, whereas progressives are more willing to allow 
regulation of speech to achieve other social goals. 
As with any brief summary, this list does not capture all of the differences 
between liberals and conservatives, and it certainly does not reflect the nuances 
of a range of positions that exist on many issues.  For example, on the current 
Court, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor are more likely to vote in a conserva-
tive direction and join Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.  But as the 2002-
03 Supreme Court term revealed, these two justices sometimes no not take the 
conservative position in key cases, such as in striking down the Texas sodomy 
 
 28. 536 U.S. 24 ( 2002). 
 29. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 30. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 31. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
 32. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
05_CHEMERINSKY_FINALFMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:20 PM 
Summer 2004] PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 59 
law33 and in upholding affirmative action,34 and their votes are decisive in pro-
ducing a more progressive result. 
III 
THE DIVIDE BETWEEN PROGRESSIVES AND  
CONSERVATIVES IS OVER RESULT, NOT METHODS 
Conservatives attempt to portray the difference between their views and 
those of progressives as being about methodology; they assert that conservative 
positions are the product of following a neutral methodology, whereas they con-
tend progressives are just imparting their own values into constitutional law.  
For example, in a recent essay, conservative Professor John McGinnis wrote, 
“The ultimate measure of any Chief Justice’s service is fidelity to the Constitu-
tion.  By that standard, Rehnquist has earned very high marks. . . . Because of 
William Rehnquist, the court has largely regarded the Constitution as law 
rather than as a mirror of the Justices’ own desires.”35 
Nonsense.  Obviously, it is not coincidence that conservatives find in the 
Constitution results that reflect their conservative ideology and that progres-
sives do exactly the same thing and interpret the Constitution to come to liberal 
conclusions.  There is an parallel between Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the 
Constitution and the Republican platform: both oppose abortion rights, favor 
more aid to religious institutions, are against affirmative action, and so on.  It is 
not that the Republican platform is based on an originalist approach to the 
Constitution.  Rather, it is that Justice Scalia’s conservative ideology, and not 
his interpretive methodology, determines his position on most constitutional is-
sues.  This is no different from progressives who come to opposite substantive 
conclusions; the only difference is that progressives do not pretend to be follow-
ing a neutral methodology. 
Many examples reveal how differences are a result of value choices between 
progressives and conservatives and not at all about methodology.  For instance, 
the Rehnquist Court’s dramatic expansion of sovereign immunity, holding that 
states cannot be sued in state courts or federal agencies,36 has no basis in the text 
of the Constitution.  No provision of the Constitution says anything about sov-
ereign immunity in state courts or federal agencies.  Nor is there any discover-
able Framers’ intent—even assuming that it is relevant—with regard to this is-
sue.  Conservatives have made a value choice to favor state immunity over state 
accountability, and no neutral methodology can explain these decisions. 
Likewise, the conservative position on affirmative action, as expressed by 
Justices such as Scalia and Thomas, is all about ideology and not methodology.  
Conservative Justices who espouse a belief in an originalist methodology do not 
 
 33. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 34. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 300 (2003). 
 35. John O. McGinnis, Rehnquist Court Renewed Civic Virtues, TIME, June 30, 2003, at 24. 
 36. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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follow it in the face of strong evidence that the Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment supported affirmative action. As such scholars as Professor Ste-
phen Siegel have demonstrated, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
engaged in aggressive affirmative action.37  Yet here, Justices Scalia and Thomas 
ignore this, just as they ignore their commitment of deference to state choices 
that they express in many other contexts. 
In Bush v. Gore,38 Justices Scalia and Thomas were key votes for the major-
ity, even though it is virtually the only instance in which either of them ever has 
found an equal protection violation—except in striking down affirmative action 
programs.  Likewise, neither Justice seemed the least bit concerned about the 
Court’s substituting its own judgment for that of the Florida Supreme Court. 
To be sure, occasionally, a conservative Justice, like Scalia, votes in a way 
contrary to how conservative judicial ideology would predict.39  But such excep-
tions are rare, and overwhelmingly the conservative Justices find conservative 
value choices in the Constitution.  Values, not methodology, determine deci-
sionmaking.  In fact, it is not surprising that conservatives embraced originalism 
at a time when their agenda included strong opposition to nontextual rights, 
such as abortion.  This allowed them to express their political agenda in seem-
ingly neutral, methodological terms.  But conservatives are willing to abandon 
originalism, such as in the affirmative action area, where it does not serve their 
substantive ends. 
I do not mean to imply that conservatives are more likely than progressives 
to bring their values to constitutional interpretation.  Interpreting a document 
written in broad open-textured language, deciding what is a compelling interest, 
inherently requires value choices by the Justices.  The main difference between 
conservatives and progressives here is that conservatives are much more likely 
to pose their decisions as the products of a neutral methodology and not as the 
products of value choices. 
IV 
WHAT SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF  
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP? 
At a time when the judiciary is becoming steadily more conservative as a re-
sult of President George W. Bush’s nominations, and with the prospect of a Su-
preme Court that is likely to be conservative for the foreseeable future, what 
should be the focus of progressive constitutional scholarship? 
Several possibilities seem misguided.  First, it does not seem possible or 
fruitful to try to generate a “neutral” theory of constitutional interpretation that 
 
 37. Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An 
Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998) (pointing to affirmative action programs by the Con-
gress which passed the Fourteenth Amendment, including the creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau). 
 38. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 39. For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas have dissented from decisions limiting punitive dam-
ages. See, e.g.,  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
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will generate liberal, but not conservative, results.  Certainly, it is attractive to 
try to invent some method of constitutional interpretation, analogous to the 
role originalism plays for conservatives, that will justify all the results progres-
sives want.  But I believe that no such theory ever can exist.40  Constitutional law 
is inherently about value choices, and no grand theory can tell which values are 
so important as to be protected from majoritarian decisionmaking.  Protecting 
abortion, allowing affirmative action, and rejecting sovereign immunity are all 
choices, and no neutral interpretive methodology can be invented to justify 
them. 
Second, I vehemently reject the approach of those who would turn against 
the courts as a solution to the reality of conservative courts.  Mark Tushnet, for 
example, has proposed the complete elimination of judicial review.41  Larry 
Kramer has urged a substantial lessening of the role of the courts in favor of 
what he terms “popular constitutionalism.”42  A full response to this movement 
is beyond this short essay, but I believe that those who reject judicial review are 
making several errors.  First, their argument against the courts focuses only on 
the Supreme Court and ignores the tremendous importance of judicial review in 
lower federal and state courts in invalidating unconstitutional laws.  Advocates 
of popular constitutionalism are fond of dismissing judicial review by pointing 
to the aberrational nature of the Warren Court.  This, however, ignores all of 
the blatantly unconstitutional laws that are struck down by other courts and 
that would be in effect without any judicial review. 
Second, the argument that judicial review is unnecessary, by scholars such as 
Professors Tushnet and Kramer, focuses on Congress’s willingness to abide by 
the Constitution.  This, however, ignores the need for judicial review of actions 
by state legislatures, city governments, public entities such as school boards, and 
acts of government officers such as police officers.  Constitutional cases, at all 
levels of courts, are far more likely to focus on these government actions than 
on laws enacted by Congress. 
Third, popular constitutionalists fail to account for the much greater will-
ingness of governments at all levels to violate the Constitution if there is no ju-
dicial review.  The existence of judicial review deters governments from enact-
ing laws that will be declared unconstitutional.  Without any judicial review, 
governments can simply disregard the Constitution when it is politically expedi-
ent to do so. 
Fourth, popular constitutionalists fail to realize that for many, especially the 
most politically powerless, it is the courts or nothing.  Unpopular minorities—
criminal defendants, prisoners, undocumented immigrants—must have judicial 
 
 40. This argument as to why such a progressive “grand theory” of constitutional law is impossible is 
developed in Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of Constitutional Law? 100 MICH. L. REV. 1249 
(2002) (book review). 
 41. MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 155-76 (1999). 
 42. Larry Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001). 
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protection; there is no realistic chance that such individuals will succeed in the 
majoritarian political process. 
It is certainly understandable why progressives would be tempted to turn 
away from the courts today.  But it is not necessary to attack the institution of 
judicial review to criticize decisions that seem misguided.  For example, it is 
possible to challenge the Court’s cramped interpretation of Congress’s powers 
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment without attacking the legiti-
macy of judicial review itself. 
So what should progressives constitutional scholars do?  It is essential that 
there be a voice in the academic literature articulating a progressive vision of 
constitutional law based on respecting the dignity of each individual, advancing 
equality, and enhancing freedom.  If nothing else, progressives can expose that 
the conservative emperor has no clothes; progressives can show that the conser-
vative claim of neutral decisionmaking is nonsense.  Progressives can demon-
strate that conservative decisions are a result of value choices by conservative 
judges and that the activism that occurs today is conservative judicial activism. 
Progressives can articulate an alternative vision of constitutional law, both 
generally and in the specific doctrinal areas of constitutional law.  Perhaps this 
law review literature will persuade lower courts.  Maybe it will help shape and 
change public opinion.  Perhaps it will occasionally triumph in the Supreme 
Court.  If nothing else, it may provide the foundation for a very different consti-
tutional law in the future.  The conservative criticisms of the Warren Court be-
came the basis for the conservative constitutional jurisprudence of today.  The 
attacks on the Lochner era Court led to the judicial deference that dominated 
from 1937 until the mid-1950s.  How the Court is talked about today can affect 
what is likely to occur in the future. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
We are at a time in U.S. history when the nation is ideologically deeply di-
vided.  Certainly, this has happened before.  But one aspect of the ideological 
chasm today is that the differences between political liberals and conservatives 
are so much defined in terms of constitutional issues.  If people on the street 
were asked to identify the issues that determine whether a person should be 
called liberal or conservative, they likely would point to issues such as abortion, 
the death penalty, affirmative action, and the relationship between religion and 
government. 
The most important challenge for progressive professors today is to decide 
what the most useful role for their scholarship can be at a time of increasingly 
conservative courts.  There are no easy answers.  But the result is likely to have 
profound consequences for how thinking about the law and ultimately the law 
itself takes shape years and decades in the future. 
